Why did India take so long to rise from a deep slumber?
By Zafar Anjum
23 Oct 2008
In his recently released book, India Express—the Future of the New Superpower, Daniel Lak argues that India’s rise as an economic power with a democratic political set up and an impressive wherewithal of soft power, has the capacity to make India the America of Asia. That is, a liberal superpower like the USA.
Daniel should know as he reported from India and Pakistan for BBC for more than 12 years.
Daniel is not alone to believe in India’s rise and rise. In the last few years, a cottage industry of sorts has emerged in publishing that analyses the Indian phenomenon. Anybody and everybody who knows something about India thinks it is his or her duty to write a book on India, its problems and challenges. This is not to belittle Daniel’s efforts which is a better specimen coming out of this cottage industry.
The point is: India is hot. And there are good reasons for it. India seems to have risen from a deep slumber—not only has it been making great economic progress, it is also taking giant leaps in the scientific and cultural space.
Yesterday, with the launch of the Chandrayan, India’s first moon mission, India joined the rank of giants like China and Japan in Asia and the US, former Soviet Union and European Space Agency outside Asia. Every Indian felt proud at this scientific achievement.
Sanjeev Sanyal, currently Deutsche Bank’s regional Chief Economist and Adjunct Fellow of the Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore, calls this remarkable rise of India as the “Indian Renaissance”.
The question to ask is: Why did India take so long to reach where it deserved to reach? What kept it behind?
The Indian Renaissance
In his just released book, The Indian Renaissance—India’s Rise after a Thousand Years of Decline, he argues that during the “golden age”, prior to the 11th century, India was a country that encouraged innovation and change. By virtue of that, India exercised huge influence, both economically and culturally (the author calls the India of those days as the United States of today), in the entire known world, especially in South East Asia (through the Silk route and the Southern Spice trade route). According to Angus Maddison’s estimates, India accounted for 33 per cent of the world economy in 1AD. Between 1000 and 1820, India’s share of the world gross domestic product (GDP) fell from 29 per cent to 16 per cent. The author concludes that “India’s position was long in decline well before the colonial period. The industrial revolution and colonial occupation only sped up the process.”
Why did this decline in the thriving Indian civilization set in, the author asks.
Even though Sanjeev seems to agree with V S Naipaul’s “India—A Wounded Civilization” thesis, he argues that per se it was not the Muslim invasions or the British colonialism that that set India back on the path of backwardness. “A change in cultural attitudes by the 11th century created a fossilized society obsessed with regulating all aspects of life according to fixed rules,” he posits. “Not surprisingly, this discouraged the spirit of innovation and led to a long and painful decline. India fell behind not just as an economy but as a civilization.”
Potential not unleashed
Even after India’s Independence in 1947, India’s potential was not unleashed due to the Nehruvian policies, says Sanyal. According to him, the turning point came in India’s destiny in 1991 when India was forced to open itself out to the world. By opening up, Sanjeev means not just the opening up of the economy but all aspects of life—and how it coincided with the communications revolution: cable TV, mobile phones and the Internet. This change was heralded, if you will, by Bengal reformers like Ram Mohun Roy and others in early 19th century when the country witnessed important social reforms and the introduction of the English language.
In the backdrop of a glorious past, Sanjeev provides an analysis of what happened after Independence and how the 1991’s liberalization unleashed India’s entrepreneurial potential. Especially interesting is a chapter on the great Indian middle class in which Sanjeev debunks the myth of the Indian middle class’ size. He claims that the “300 million” size of the Indian middle class is exaggerated, which is quite convincing. What he does not examine is whether this BPO and KPO spawned middle class is solid in its base or will it be washed away by the wave of global economic depression.
Towards a bright future
Towards the end of the book, Sanjeev paints a bright picture for India’s future. He points out that India needs institutional reforms to cope with the changes brought about by economic prosperity but perhaps he relies too heavily on the moral courage of the middle class to make it happen.
Unfortunately, he also does not invest much thought into the social divisions that beset today’s India. Apart from that, India also faces political challenges. How will India cope with the growing political interference in its enterprises, as seen in the recent Tata Nano case in Singur (in West Bengal) and retrenchment and later re-employment of Jet Airways employees in Mumbai? Will it affect India’s entrepreneurial spirit?
The world’s gaze is fixed on India to see what happens next.
Zafar Anjum is the online editor of MIS Asia portal.
